• The increasing demand from individuals to have their privacy respected or to take decisions about the management of their information assumes a significant role in business activities and it becomes an important element for building public trust in service providers.
The competitive value of data protection
For many years data protection has been considered an undue burden for the private sector, as it limits business opportunities, reduces innovation in the area of customized services and increases operating costs. These arguments have been used by lobbies in order to criticize the EU Directive 95/46/EC 1 and to suggest a limited implementation of its principles. This attitude has now reemerged with regard to the new EU Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation. 2 Firstly, these arguments represent a limited and incorrect representation of the impact of data protection regulations. They consider the costs due to legal compliance without analysing the related benefits and the external effects on other areas (such as security, corporate reputation, value of informational assets) that should also be included in a correct and global estimation of the costs.
Secondly, they underestimate the demand for data protection coming from the society at large. The increasing technological power of data collection and data mining have generated a reaction in terms of rising concern about privacy and social control.
In a society where many voices outline the risks of massive data collection, concentration of power over information, attention has become focused mainly on privacy policies adopted by private companies and governments. This concern is not contradicted by the theories, which claim that the right to privacy no longer exists as people willingly share information in return for economic benefits or free services. Even if the economic exploitation of personal information is an accepted (or desirable) consequence of the information age and of the pervasive use of ICT services, these are not sufficient elements to consider the protection of personal data as outdated.
As demonstrated in recent studies on young people, a more intense activity of data sharing is linked with the consciousness of the value of personal information and of the consequences of sharing it, and this consciousness is higher among digital natives than in the older generations. 4 It seems that the more the data are exploited, the more people seem to acquire a consciousness of informational self-determination. Furthermore, information about risks related to data protection or news on data breaches increase the awareness of the implications and relevance of privacy policies.
In this context, the increasing demand from individuals to have their privacy respected 5 or to take decisions about the management of their information assumes a significant role in business activities and it becomes an important element for building public trust in service providers. 6 Moreover, a lack of data protection increases the risks of illegitimate access to information or misuse of personal data, with a potential chilling effect on individual willingness to share and systems of analyses and of dominant positions held by big companies, the self-determination of the single individual is inadequate and insufficient to create an effective and conscious market activity concerning personal data.
As emerged from the recitals in the preamble to the EU Directive 95/46/EC, the original goal of data protection was to increase trust in data collecting and managing services realized by governments and companies. This perspective is not considered if data protection is only viewed as an economic burden. The announcement of the death of privacy is only apparently useful for aggressive policies based on data exploitation, since the lack of attention on data protection exposes companies to litigations, has negative effects on their reputation and leads to a loss of clients. In this sense, the marketing strategy adopted by European ICT companies in offering services in the US is revealing: they stress the higher level of data protection guaranteed by their services in comparison with the US providers.
The increasing demand for data protection due to new technological applications and the necessity to reinforce user's trust in services provided by the public and private sector is inducing legislators to approve data protection laws or amend the existing regulations in order to adapt them to the technological evolution and new challenges.
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In this context the US and EU regulations have a central role due to the dimension of their marketplaces and the consequent impact of data protection on consumer protection. Furthermore, both the US and EU have a relevant influence on foreign legal models. On the one hand, the US one emerging from the recent EU Proposal. On the other hand, the EU uses its regulation in order to indirectly influence other countries, by preventing European companies from sending data to non-EU countries that do not ensure "an adequate level of protection".
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From this perspective, the impact of the EU Proposal on data protection regulation should be analysed in order to evaluate its effect on online user's behaviour and, consequently, on business strategies.
An evaluation of the possible impact of the EU Proposal on online behaviour
The EU proposal for a general data protection regulation represents an evolution of the existing EU practical applications of these principles, seems to be an appropriate response to the needs of an evolving world.
Leaving aside these aspects concerning the legislative solution adopted, the provisions of the EU proposal have a positive effect in reinforcing user's trust and self-determination in social networks and, at the same time, define a uniform set of rules that reduce unfair competition due to forumshopping practices 14 and introduce different solutions and remedies which are able to strengthen the level of compliance with the law.
Increasing the user's trust
For the past few years, the role of informed consent has been going through a crisis. It remains the most important instrument to affirm the central role of self-determination in data management and to offer individuals the possibility to negotiate their personal information. However, at the same time technology and modern systems of data mining (e.g. Big Data) drastically limit the user's capability to understand data processing, to be aware of it and to refuse consent.
These limitations are more evident in social networks. Firstly, the huge amount of data provided by the users represents the optimal dataset for predictive analyses 15 and, in many cases, the user is not aware of the possibility to extract new and different data from the information provided. The technological solutions used to manage data and how they work are unknown to the user, since they are not evident. Secondly, the information regarding data processing and its related technologies is given by means of long, unclear and changeable privacy policies, with the result that there is a disclosure that is only formal, but does not represent a sufficient solution in order to guarantee user self-determination. Finally, the presence of big players and the concentration of specific services in the hands of one or two companies (Facebook, Google, Twitter, etc.) induce the users to accept the conditions proposed in order not to lose the opportunities offered by internet services. In this sense, in many cases, big ICT companies have openly declared that our personal information is the due currency to pay their free services.
In this scenario, keeping the focus of data protection on the individual and its decisions is no longer adequate. If legislators consider data protection as a fundamental right, 16 it is necessary to reinforce its protection in order to make it effective and not conditioned by the asymmetries due to the factors described above. In this sense, an efficient way to obtain privacy-oriented technologies is to require a mandatory evaluation of the data protection implications in the product/service design and development phases, in order to make products and services intrinsically resistant to misuse of personal information from the outset. but is now reinforced by a new restrictive definition that limits the collection of data "to the minimum necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed".
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The first two instruments, data protection impact assessment, privacy by design/by default, merit a wider consideration. They do not represent a new approach to data protection, as privacy impact As shown by the application of data protection assessment to the RFID technologies, 25 this impact assessment is able to generate privacy-oriented solutions, offering a high level of data protection assessment is usually summarized in a document, which describe the solutions adopted, and their effects on improving privacy.
22 In this sense the interaction between diffident process produces a result that is different from the simple arrogation and sum of them, for this reason a positive evaluation in terms of privacy impact assessment of every single process does not permit to draw the conclusion that also the whole system of linked data processing activities has not a negative impact on privacy. and, in this way, it contributes to increasing users' trust in technology and its related services.
Another significant element of this assessment is the continuity of the evaluation that follows the product and the service during their entire lifecycle, redefining the assessment as new features or modifications are introduced. This ex ante and permanent analysis differs from traditional risk analysis, which is based on verification of the level of compliance realized ex post. This approach reduces the need for the legislator to follow technological developments and induces preventive solutions to ensure compliance with the principles of data protection.
From the perspective of the competitive value of data protection, an efficient assessment can reduce costs, in terms of loss of investments due to the inadequacy of services or products with regard to the existing legal limits. Finally, the benefits of investing in this evaluation process becomes clear if
we consider the effect of the assessment in preventing misuse of data or illicit data processing. By contrast, an incomplete and inadequate assessment can have a negative impact in terms of reputation related to data breach, given the increasing attention to data protection among costumers and business partners. In this sense, the provision of Article 33 of the EU Proposal should be considered in a favourable manner, as it tries to address all the critical points positively.
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Taking into consideration the specific skills required to realize the impact assessment and its cost, the Proposal does not extend this process to every kind of data processing, but requires the assessment only when there are "specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes".
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At the same time, the size of the companies, in terms of their resources, is also relevant.
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In this sense, the Proposal empowers the Commission to adopt delegated acts for the purpose of further specifying the criteria and conditions concerning data protection assessment in order to "consider specific measures for micro, small and medium-sized 28 See Proposal, art 33 (3).
enterprises".
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To increase users' trust in data processing the public availability of impact assessments could be useful.
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This is a critical aspect due to the need to balance the information about data processing provided to users and the security and competitive issues of enterprises.
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The conflict between these opposite issues emerged in the Commission work, as is evident from the comparison between the draft version of the proposal 32 and the text finally approved. The first document states that "the assessment shall be made easily accessible to the public", without any prejudice to the protection of commercial, public interests or security of the processing operations. any reference to the public availability of the assessment has been deleted.
The data protection assessment procedure is also fundamental in order to define an adequate strategy to limit privacy risks. It is important that a synergy develops between this kind of analyses and the adoption of solutions of privacy by design.
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Both privacy by design and by default are generally adopted by the EU Proposal, which empowers the Commission to detail these solutions.
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The adoption of privacy-oriented technologies or processes, which embed data protection into their structure, is more suitable than ordinary "behavioural" rules to address the transnational dimension and continuous evolution aspects of ICT regulation.
Data protection is usually based on rules that permit or prohibit some activities ("behavioural" there is a convergence on this approach between the US 36 and EU.
Reinforcing user self-determination
Privacy-oriented and trustworthy services increase user propensity to share data, stimulate the digital economy and fair competition. However, the competitive value of data protection can be assured and enhanced only if the user's self-determination over personal data is guaranteed. From this point of view, countering the phenomena of data lock-in and "social" lock-in is fundamental.
The first is related to technological standards and data formats and limits the migration from one services to another, which offer the same functions; the second is the consequence of the dominant position held by some big players in the market of social networks that intrinsically limits the user's possibility to recreate the same network elsewhere.
In order to contrast the technological lock-in, the EU Proposal affirms the general principle of data portability. This right, which will be more detailed by the Commission through specific acts, concerns only personal data "processed by electronic means and in a structured and commonly used format". Data portability gives the user the right to obtain a copy of the data undergoing processing "in an electronic and structured format which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject" from the controller.
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With regard to the "social" lock-in, there are no adequate answers, due to the fact that this situation draws its origin from the market and the existing barriers to competition. From this perspective, data protection authorities and legislators can only reinforce user self-determination, in order to limit the negative effects of this kind of lock-in. In this sense, the detailed regulation on the right to be forgotten provided by the EU Proposal seems to represent a positive action, since it clarifies how to exercise this right, which was only briefly mentioned in the Directive 95/46/EC.
Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC stipulates that personal data must only be collected for specified purposes and "not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes". The same article states that personal data should be kept in a form that permits the identification of data subjects "for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed". provisions of this Directive" from the controller.
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Erasure is not strictly related to the dynamics of media communication, but to any data processing realized without the consent of the data subject or without providing adequate information to the data subject or outside the legal framework defined by data protection laws.
From this perspective, the length of time of the data processing and its purposes has a key-role.
For this reason, the expression "right to be forgotten" used in Article 17 of the Proposal is inappropriate and misleading, as it represents the English translation of droit à l'oubli, a right recognized by different decisions in France and in other European countries and not unknown in US case law.
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But the droit à l'oubli is not the general right to delete personal information; it represents a limit to media activities in disseminating individual facts connected to past events that have no relationship with the present lifestyle or activities of the data subject and the relevance of these social or political facts does not prevail over their private nature.
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This contradiction is more evident due to the fact that Article 17 of the proposed Regulation does not consider the right to be forgotten from the media perspective and provides an explicit exception with regard to this aspect. 42 From this perspective, when the period of time in which interest in a specific private event is justified by its impact on the community has elapsed, the individual has the right to regain an anonymous life and privacy. This conception of the right to be forgotten is based on the fundamental the need of an individual to determine the development of their life in an autonomous way, without being perpetually or periodically stigmatized as a consequence of a specific action performed in the past, especially when these events occurred many years ago and do not have any relationship with the contemporary context.
43 Proposal, art 17 (3) (a) declares that the right to be forgotten does not impact on freedom of expression and, in accordance with art 80, Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations "for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression in order to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the rules governing freedom of expression". We should also underline that the notion of "journalistic purposes" adopted by the Proposal is broad and not strictly limited to media Considering the wide notion of "journalistic purposes" adopted by the Proposal, 44 See above n 43.
45 We could also observe that the different representation of the right to be forgotten as the right to have personal data completely removed is consistent with the notion of droit à l'oubli, but in this case it has a wider scope, because the erasure of the data is not only related to the loss of interest in past events, but also to other situations (e.g. wrongful or illicit data processing) that do not concern the balance between media and individual life. within the two main hypotheses already defined, albeit more rigidly, by the Directive 95/46/EC in force:
48 erasure due to data retention in contrast with the law or due to the original or supervening lack of the reasons that legitimate the processing of information.
With regard to the problem of social lock-in, described above, Article 17 (1) (b) and (c) are relevant, as they provide the erasure of the data when "the data subject withdraws consent" or exercises the right to object.
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The most critical aspect of Article 17 is defining the subjects to whom the rules are addressed, particularly with regard to Article 17 (2) and the related case in which "the controller [...] has made the personal data public" and consequently should take "all reasonable steps, including technical measures, in relation to data for the publication of which the controller is responsible, to inform third parties which are processing such data, that a data subject requests them to erase any links to, or copy or replication of that personal data". Working Party suggests that these cases should be considered under Article 17.
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In social networks, the presence of a high number of contacts could exclude the application of the so-called "household exception" 54 to the user, considering her as data controller, but also in this case the service provider assumes an active role in managing this user's information, 55 that legitimises the application of Article 17.
Despite the criticism expressed by internet companies, the burden related to the application of Article 17 does not seem excessive in the present phase of the information age. In a context in which few companies are managing an enormous amount of data and spreading or organizing it in order to make it accessible online, the balance between the individual right to be forgotten and the "right to make profits" cannot be found by requiring data subjects to have an active role in searching for any information concerning them, when this information has been spread on-line due to the business-model adopted by the controller. At the same time the EU proposal does not impose a general obligation to erase data managed by third parties, but requires only that third parties be informed that the data subject has requested them to delete any links or copy or replication and then further restricts this obligation by introducing the notion of proportionality. In this sense, it requires they take all "reasonable" steps to achieve its aim.
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Criticism about the right to be forgotten based on the freedom of expression are not well addressed. 56 See Proposal, art 17 (2); see also art 17 (7), (9).
The provision of Article 17 (3) explicitly excludes the possibility to invoke the right to be forgotten We should draw the same conclusion with regard to search engines, since service providers should be considered as a publisher under press law if we consider the indexing of links related to news as journalistic purposes.
Finally, the digital nature of information and its possibility to be shared and re-shared by third parties has been considered a limit to the enforcement of the right to be forgotten due to the potential pluralism of jurisdictions related to multiple re-publication or re-use of information around the world.
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The decentralized and multi-jurisdictional character of Internet represents a well-known obstacle to the effective protection of individual rights in this environment, but, at the same time, the nature of the right to be forgotten as defined by Article 17 seems to offer elements for a better and more efficient protection. The rules induce controllers to have an active role with regard to third party publication and they place the burden not on the person which the data refer to but on the entities that are in the best position to manage the data flows.
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The critical aspect related to these provisions is the necessity for an updated list of third parties receiving any item of data regarding an individual and to follow the information in this circulation through different controllers. This could generate a wide and invasive tracking system. In order to strike a balance, the idea of limiting the obligation to inform third parties to the first receiver of the information should be considered. At the same time, specific provisions should be introduced which 58 See Proposal, art 17 (2), see also art 13.
oblige the controller who received the above-mentioned request, to notify the third parties to whom the data were disclosed. In this way, a self-implementing sequence of requests can obtain the final result of the complete erasure of the information, without any active role of the data subject except for the first request to the first controller, and without tracking the flows of information.
Increasing user's confidence and fair competition
The competitive value of data protection and its positive effect on user's confidence also derives from more uniform legislation and from the introduction of different means of control to ensure compliance to data protection regulation. More uniform legislation will be achievable through the adoption of a Regulation that will replace the Directive 95/46/EC and define a single legal framework on data protection in the European Union, without national variations due to the local implementation of the directive. The interpretation of the Regulation will be more uniform by reason of a stronger cooperation between national data protection authorities, data protection rules will benefit companies and users, reducing differences and contradictions in the interpretations of the rules and, in this way, increasing compliance.
Further elements that guarantee a higher level of compliance are the introduction of specific solutions of monitoring and ad hoc administrative sanctions. Here, the Proposal introduces significant sanctions based on fines determined as a percentage of companies' annual worldwide turnover.
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This remedy has received various expressions of criticism. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the prescriptions empower data protection authorities to evaluate the entity of the fine case by case, which will not necessarily be the maximum amount. On the other hand, without a relevant economic disincentive the widespread nature of some unfair practices and the asymmetry that exists between users and big companies will produce a limited deterrent effect, especially when the illicit data management does not cause economic losses to the users.
However, the sanctions are not sufficient to induce compliance and fair practice, alone. They should be combined with a more accountable organization of data management. The introduction of the data protection officer, 
